The big money contracts handed to Clint Dempsey, Michael Bradley, Jermaine Jones, Kaka, and others. The record ratings for USA's Round of 16 run in the 2014 World Cup. Two new "franchises" entering MLS, with plenty more entering NASL. What could possibly say that US Soccer has not progressed since 1996, or perhaps 2002? A lot. 

One buzzword constantly described by those around MLS to tout its growth is its "signing of 'Homegrown Players'". Some of those "Homegrown Players"--which really can include any player that joined an MLS-affiliated USSF Development Academy team and stuck with it for one year. A player who fulfill those "rules" and plays college soccer for a couple years can still be a Homegrown Player, regardless of how good of a soccer player they are. 

Is that necessarily a "player staying with his club for an entire season?" If so, what is necessarily in those academies (MLS, NASL, USL, etc.) that is any different from the other DA teams? In a sense, these clubs, in which players still have to pay an enormous cost ($5000) to be a part of a team. This is despite the USSF's public statements in wanting to be open to everyone. So, only those who really can afford to play in the DA can really pay. Soccer is supposed to be a sport of the working class, and the underprivileged, and the fact that the USSF likes to tout achievements in its "DA," namely the players that go onto MLS action--the likes of Wil Trapp, Shane O'Neill, Diego Fagundez, Bill Hamid, DeAndre Yedlin, Dillon Serna, Luis Gil, and Carlos Saucedo.

While a team is certainly familiar with a player, narrowing the focus to just DA players restricts the pool of players a team will try to identify. A larger pool of players will still go to college, and MLS teams are still likely to find good players in the SuperDraft and among the college costless agents. All players are equally as likely to be discarded when "newer, shinier toys" show up--at least "shinier toys, according to the managers", which might include its fair share of politics. For every Bill Hamid, there's a Victor Pineda who's mysteriously discarded by his team, and having to force through a loan just to be able to play professionally. The "Homegrown Players" might be caught in a situation where they may not be able to release from their contracts to play college soccer. 

But there is where the costs of the DA, when put together with college costs (fewer soccer players receive full scholarships than do football and basketball players), can make the idea of playing professionally demoralizing if the player is not in Europe, Mexico, or South America, let alone the faraway realms of Asian soccer, or managed to make good money in MLS. 

Although MLS seems to list the salaries of its players, it's important to recognize that no MLS team truly exists in a market with a low cost of living. While a player making a pre-tax income of $40,000 would have them making a living wage almost everywhere, except for Washington DC and New York City, many of those players, as one DA coach explained, have to pay back those loans, which would significantly increase the amount of money a player has to earn. This does not count the fact the player would likely have to room up with other players to pay the rent in a safer, more fashionable (with less crime, and dealing with fewer of the problems the "urban poor" have to face) area. Some players, including Colorado keeper Joe Nasco on a $50,000 salary, had to take second jobs in order to pay the bills. 

Young players craving stability, a debt-costless future (as long as they don't spend their cash too soon), and fame would likely be turned away by the relative lack of money in it, especially if the player has a child before signing his first truly pro contract. (Instead of a $25K minimum cost of living, the cost immediately shoots up to between $45,000-$66,000, not enough for many to continue with the league. Some college players have decided to keep journeyman careers in the lower divisions of Germany, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark alive because of this. Others leave the sport altogether. The MLS single-entity has conspired to limit player salaries, and limit what teams could ask for players within the league to keep player wages (and spending) artificially low.

In Fraser v. MLS, the case which tested MLS's single-entity structure, the decision only went in MLS's favor because MLS argued players could vote with their feet--and play in Mexico, England, Germany, England, etc. if they wanted more money, or players could be sold to said teams if they were good enough. In the last year, 19 MLS teams have only sold nine players to foreign teams (Michael Farfan (who was since cut by the team he was sold to), Rafael Baca, Camilo Sanvezzo, Ryan Johnson, Dejan Jakovic, Bobby Warshaw, Uri Rosell, Erik Palmer-Brown (though the details are being finalized), Doneil Henry, Giancarlo Gonzalez, and Fredy Montero. When on-loan players Jerry Bengston, Jose Adolfo Valencia, and Jose Luis Anangono are included, the list grows to twelve. That is still not even one player sold per team per transfer window.

Of those players, only Camilo Sanvezzo, Ryan Johnson, Dejan Jakovic, Uri Rosell, Bobby Warshaw, Doneil Henry, and Fredy Montero saw significant game time, and even then--Dejan Jakovic, Doneil Henry and Erik Palmer-Brown were the only domestic players sold. Going back to 2013, the league lured back Jared Jeffery, Luis Robles, Clint Dempsey, Tony Taylor, Carlos Bocanegra, Lee Nguyen, Michael Bradley, Chris Rolfe (even back to 2013), Jermaine Jones, Maurice Edu, and Michael Parkhurst on Designated Player (or close to Designated Player) contracts. Many players cited a lack of playing time, or hard times, or the allure of multi-million dollar wages (that come with being a USA star). Of the players MLS has sold, only Andy Najar will net an MLS team a multi-million dollar transfer fee in the upcoming transfer window on additional sales, and none were a USA international above the U-17 level. 

This is not exactly a huge list of players moving outside of MLS. More are moving into MLS than moving out by a fee. And many that aren't are put in a purgatory where they are still property of the club, yet they cannot be released from their contract to play elsewhere. And so, it is clear MLS, and USSF in supporting MLS, has violated the terms of the Fraser decision. One player on Klinsmann's list who might be moving is NASL Golden Ball winner Miguel Ibarra, who has been monitored by Pumas UNAM. But Mexican teams, like Spanish teams, like Italian teams, have plenty of players in their Fuerzas Basicas who can take Ibarra's place should he ever move to Pumas (let alone incumbent striker Matias Britos)

Is the domestic play much better, despite what appears to be a huge pay disparity between the "names" and the unknowns? Players seem to be passing and moving around the ball well, but the movements just seem a touch out of coordination, or just a little bit too slow, or the players a little too timid under pressure. Unfortunately, according to a USSF DA coach, not much has improved since "the glory days" of Bruce Arena's reign as USA manager--when the IMG Academy was still in existence. Neither Bob Bradley nor Jurgen Klinsmann have been able to match or better Bruce Arena's World Cup record--and Klinsmann seems to have forgotten the Bob Bradley basics of starting with a balanced lineup, and tilting the balance towards attacking creative players.

With Carlos Vela back in the Mexico fold and ready to make a meal out of Matt Besler, Omar Gonzalez, Kyle Beckerman, John Brooks, and company, Klinsmann will likely get shown up as simply a "disruptor" who was not tactically, or motivationally, much better than Bob Bradley's teams--and whose teams showed brightly in the first few minutes, but lost interest and attacking incentive, midfield pressure, and defensive organization as the matches moved on. 

Klinsmann wanted to disrupt the league's way of thinking. But he did not do its good players justice, by calling in players like Graham Zusi, Besler, Omar Gonzalez, Chris Wondolowski, Brad Davis, and Corey Ashe who were technically limited. Younger standouts, and technically good veterans, including Lee Nguyen, Shane O'Neill, Kellyn Rowe, Dillon Powers, Amobi Okugo, Kofi Sarkodie, Chris Klute, Andrew Farrell, Benny Feilhaber, as well as a now unattached Juan Agudelo, could have been seen in European, Mexican, and South American circles by receiving a call up and playing with the national team. It might have raised the profile of those players long enough for them to find teams abroad willing to pay a fee to take them in (and have them play). 

It also might have included some fresh, competent blood into a national team that was lacking it more and more as Klinsmann put his stamp on his team. A 4-1 loss to an Ireland B-team on Tuesday, where the USA was thoroughly outplayed showed what might be next, when Dempsey, Donovan, Bradley, Howard, Guzan, Bocanegra, Feilhaber, Edu, and others are too old to carry the National Team.

The blood that was brought in is simply not good enough (as a whole). And Klinsmann has proven time and time again he cannot get his teams to mesh together. It's as if the USA hired a manager with no prior managing experience (or bad managing experience), which is a common problem in MLS and USSF in general. Managers like Ryan Nelsen, Ben Olsen, Greg Vanney, Mike Petke, Gregg Berhalter can all be hired with minimum coaching experience, and a fired MLS hack of a manager (John Hackworth) can replace one of the most competent recruiters (if not coaches) in USA youth national team history in Hugo Perez. 

At a barest minimum, the combined "no sense of direction" can only equate USSF to two teams--Chivas and the Washington Redskins--who believe their own hype so much that they continue to make fundamental mistakes, with regards to the larger picture--actually producing good players and national teams with cohesion. (The German-Americans and ex-pat players who were not raised in the United States are only making worse.) If USA fans want to see a team play with cohesion and belief, they have to realize that, despite his trophies, it's an older, white, foreign-born clone of RGIII that's running the show. 

Within the narrative of the collective bargaining agreement, minimum salaries must be raised to at least $100,000-$300,000 in the first tier, to ensure that whatever good players are out there do not stop because "the goal is simply a college scholarship". The MLS and USSF Players Associations (if there are such things) must be brave enough to blow single-entity up, and to ensure the identification of players becomes as a means of searching deeper than teams had to do so before, just to survive in D1. USSF, when hiring managers, must hire managers that can scout within the entire country (throughout all its teams) to find good players. Any "philosophy" or attempt at possession soccer, must be drilled in at the youngest of youth ranks (inside and outside USSF DA) first and work their way up as the players get older. And the development and recruitment of players has to occur on every pitch, not just AYSO, high school, middle school, or USSF DA pitches. It has to fundamentally include everyone and any space that has turned into a soccer or futsal pitch, no matter what the ages of the kids are. It means teams are truly of zero cost to kids, if the kids are good enough (and if they are invited, teams will pay for the transportation costs of those kids to get to the trialing destination and team practices). 

Right now, the USA men's national team, MLS, and USSF is about as competent and ethical as Chivas or the Redskins. One faces relegation and punishment by means of competition, and the other faces constant harassment (and media embarrassment). All have decided to let problems build up over time, while relishing in short-term glory and the unquestioning loyalty of their supporters. Unfortunately, USSF will be best served by admitting it has fundamental problems in the way everything is handled, especially if it has designs on keeping a streak of six straight World Cup appearances alive.